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THE DESIGN-INDUCED PART OF THE
HUMAN ERROR PROBLEM IN AVIATION
C. 0.

MILLER*

INTRODUCTION

H

UMAN ERROR is a fascinating though paradoxical subject.
Each of us has had experience with it-we have all made
errors-hence we are "expert," each in his own way. Still, the level
of understanding of why accident-producing errors are made and
more importantly, how better to control them is not very high.
Only since the early 1960's has much serious research really been
accomplished into the human error problem in aviation; albeit
many investigators (e.g. McFarland at Harvard, Chapanis of Johns
Hopkins University and Zeller of the USAF Directorate of Safety)
had, pioneered the subject earlier.'
As to the relationship between that popular kind of aviation
human error, pilot error, and the design of airplanes, consider the
following as an example that the problem has been around awhile.
In July 1903, an otherwise unidentified intrepid aeronaut, Major
L. S. Blackman, was experimenting with airfoils and gliders,
especially their attendant stability problems. His "flight test" report,
six months before the Kitty Hawk episode of the Wright Brothers,
concluded by saying:
[F]or the present and sometime to come, safety will depend chiefly
on the skill of the aeronaut and the constructive strength of the
machine.2
This was an accurate forecast. Of the first eleven Air Corps
* Mr. Miller, President of Safety System, Inc., is a consultant in accident prevention. He is the former Director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety at the National Transportation Safety Board.
ICornell, Minimizing Human Errors, SPACE/AERONAUTICS, May 1968.
2

Quote from Blackman, AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL, 1903, in Brewer, Point of

Origin, APPROACH, August 1964, at 2.
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accidents, from September 1908 to February 1914, four were
clearly and singularly pilot judgment problems; one combined
judgment with a severe weather situation; four and probably a
fifth were initially charged to pilot error but in retrospect suggest
a design problem (misaligned thrust) which induced loss of control. Only one, the first one, was clearly a material-caused accident
-the propellor broke.'
Interestingly enough, an analyst of these accidents indicated:
It is evident that the machines in which the accidents occurred
were not old, and the pilots were not novices ...

nearly every one

of the accidents was due to the pilots and not the machines."
The hours flown by these pilots ranged from twelve to eighty-six
with corresponding numbers of flights ranging from fifty-two to
469!
We have come a long way in three quarters of an aviation
century ... or have we?
THEORIES OF HUMAN ERROR

In examining human error in general, several approaches to its
categorization or interpretation can be identified. At the risk of
oversimplification, in order to stay within practical confines for this
article, and to use terminology for communication, not to demonstrate intellectual prowess, consider the following ways to think
about human error.
1. The Mistake Approach
Certainly, this is the most traditional way to think of error
which at least borders on blameworthiness, since error is intimately
associated with our laws and other functional control precepts of
our society. Do something "right" or as others expect or want you
to do; else you have erred. Meister summarized this approach nicely
when he categorized human error as:
(1) Performance of a required action incorrectly;
(2) Failure to perform the required action;
(3) Performance of a required action out of sequence; or
3
4

Borden, The First Eleven, AEROSPACE SAFETY, May
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(4) Performance of a non required action.'
Note the emphasis on "requirements" and the inference that
judgments will be made as to the correctness of the actions. This
presumes a "requirement" has been delineated clearly and that
reasonable men can make something other than discriminatory
value judgments. Of course, both of these presumptions are severely
and routinely tested in the minds of those of us who have followed
closely aviation accident investigations, resultant public hearings,
tort litigation proceedings, etc.
2. As A Task-overload
This approach is perhaps the most modem way of examining
human error and certainly the approach taken by the behaviorists.
Usually, in aviation, this is described with reference to an illustration such as Figure 1. A flight is charted by phases along the
abscissa, with the ordinate being the task loading required for a
particular operation. A limit of pilot capacity is shown as at a
theoretical upper limit running horizontally along the top of the
illustration, but this limit can-and is--degraded by the realities
of life, such as sickness, emotional variances, training deficiencies,
etc. Similarly, the nominal task requirement can increase in the
event of malfunctions of equipment or unique demands of the
operational situation, whether resulting from emergencies or events
implicit in the mission. The task overload theory simply presumes
to examine the juxtaposition of tasks needed to be accomplished
and the pilot's capability; and where they overlap, the error/accident
is probable and thus something must be rectified-the tasks and/or
the man.
3. The Convenient Cubbyhole Concept
This occurs when a classification of descriptive statements is
developed which, at the moment, is logical in the mind of the
system's creator. It gains acceptance with use and becomes improved to some degree with time. Major changes in the logic cannot be done, however, lest such changes inhibit analysis and communication of combined old and new data. Classic examples of
this are found in manuals of accident code classifications such as
5 Meister,
tems,

Methods of Predicting Human Reliability in Man-Machine Sys-

HUMAN FACTORS

(Dec. 1964).
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that used by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).'
Phrases are contained therein like: "Continued VFR flight into
adverse weather conditions," "Failed to extend landing gear,"
"Improper preflight preparation and/or planning," or "Misunderstanding of orders or instructions." The problem is that accident
investigators are prone to stop their search for factual information
short of why these situations develop, particularly if they are rushed,
or if they do not understand human behavior sufficiently to ask
adequate questions upstream of the obvious cause factor. Furthermore, if a behavioristic model were to be imposed to direct investigative search for more of the why, chances are the model
would not be too compatible with the previously evolved logic.
4. From the Accident Prevention Viewpoint
Hopefully, this is the orientation that should be used in examination of errors made within the aviation system. It is exemplified by
Pierson in an excellent, simple, two-page bulletin issued through
the Flight Safety Foundation.! He suggested that pilot error should
be examined on a "factor" basis and from the point of view of the
type of corrective action that appears most practical. Accordingly,
the major categories he chose were:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Design-induced pilot factor;
Operations-induced pilot factor;
Environment-influenced pilot factor; and
Innate pilot factor.

Respective sublistings pertaining to the above included items
which could be designed out of the system (e.g., instruments that
cannot be seen properly because of their location); change in
operational procedures (e.g., air traffic control terminology);
avoidance of certain environmental influences (e.g., weather
phenomena such as shallow fog or thunderstorms); and selection
and control of human operators observing their inherent or acquired limitations (e.g., medical and psychological conditions).
One of the landmark reports in this entire field, of course, was
6 BUREAU OF AVIATION SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,
AND INCIDENTS (June,
1970).
' Pierson, Taxonomy of Pilot Error (Factor), FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATIONS
HUMAN FACTORS BULLETIN, (Jan./Feb. 1975).
MANUAL OF CODE CLASSIFICATIONS, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
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the "Aircraft Design-Induced Pilot Error" (ADIPE) study conducted by the Bureau of Aviation Safety (BAS) then under the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).' Like Pierson, the authors of this
study took an accident prevention approach and had, in fact, used
a more encompassing definition of design-induced error, to wit:
[T]he term 'Design-Induced Error' was considered as including all
factors that may have influenced the action or non-action of the
pilot and thus were related to the accident. Under this interpretation, factors that interfaced with action which might have prevented the accident, (including) the lack of data in flight manuals
(and flight characteristics) requiring an unusual level of pilot competence are included among the factors inducing error.'
In other words, BAS went well beyond detail design deficiencies
per se although emphasis was not lost on such things as "improper
sensing of controls, inadequate identification of controls, inadequate
indication and/or warning to the pilot and lack of standardization
... ." A study sample of 3,732 cases was used that represented
seventy-four percent of the total accidents occurring in 1964.
The findings of the ADIPE study were limited in 1967, as such
an analysis would still be now, by the absence of an effective
human-factors accident investigative protocol. Nevertheless, very
significant conclusions were reached regarding stall-spin, groundloop, power plant failure, nose-over, hard landing, overshoot, undershoot, and retractable landing gear accidents.' Interestingly enough,
a follow-up program to ADIPE was undertaken by the FAA which
had actually funded the CAB/BAS effort. Updated data were
obtained in October 1969 and September 1973, and statistical
analyses similar to those in the original study were reportedly made;
however, no reports have ever been published.
THE MAN-MACHINE SYSTEM

Activity in the pilot error field in recent years has been highlighted by a relatively informal NASA-industry working group
comprised of representatives from United Airlines, Air Line Pilots'
I BUREAU
SIGN-INDUCED

OF AVIATION SAFETY,
PILOT ERROR

9id.

'lld. at 131-35.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS

(Feb. 1967).

BOARD, AIRCRAFT DE-
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Association, Douglas Aircraft Co., and private consultants. With
coordination effected by Dr. Charles E. Billings of the ManMachine Integration Branch of the NASA Ames Research Center
at Moffett Field, California, a preliminary working paper has been
published.1 The paper emphasizes the information processing aspect of the human error problem. That is, a behavioristic model
is presented that can form the basis for more effective investigation
and determination of human error variables including those which
are design-induced. See Fig. 2. Indeed, this early working paper also
contains outline material for interviewing that can aid significantly
in human factors accident/incident investigations-the first step
towards that missing investigative protocol noted earlier." The
effort by this working group was the predominant influence leading
to the involvement of NASA in the FAA's "Aviation Safety
Reporting System" scheduled to be implemented nationally during
the spring of 1976.
Another way of examining the man-machine interface, which
really is at the crux of the question of design-induced pilot error,
was previously described by this author first in 1966 and again in
1974." As noted in Figure 3, man and the machine interact in
closed loop fashion. Man perceives, decides, and reacts (or responds) based on current stimuli with subsequent behavior also
being a function of both memory (short and long term) and
psycho-physiological capability. The resultant control functions
thus affect the external stimuli and/or the data presented by the
machine (e.g. instrument information), and the process starts over
again. Or to place this in more literal terms, everything the man
perceives, be it through a sensing process or through his memory,
is a source of potential error. Whatever decision he makes, whether
influenced by what he perceives or by his memory, is a source of
11Barnhart,

et al, A Method for the Study of Human Factors in Aircraft

NASA
Operations,
2

TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM

X-62, 472 (Sept. 1975).

' See text following note 10, supra.

3Address by C. 0. Miller, "Safety Considerations and Human Reliability
of the Experimental Test Pilot," Human Factors Society Annual Banquet, in

Anaheim, California, Nov. 3, 1966; Address by C. 0. Miller, "Legal Litigation
Barriers to the Communication of Human Factors Safety Information," Flight

Safety Foundation International Safety Seminar, in Williamsburg, Virginia,
Nov. 1974 [hereinafter cited as Address].
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potential error. Each of his reactions, be it induced by a decision
or something from his memory, is a source of potential error.
These potential errors occur in this very complicated process
because the human being is the most complicated device ever conceived and is subject to certain capabilities and limitations. A person
may not even realize he has these inbound and outbound "filters",
allowing just certain types, quantities and qualities of "data"-to
use a broad term-to be received. He can produce only certain
types, quantities, and qualities of output. His identification, interpretation, and choice functions in particular are so highly dependent
upon training and previous experience, as well as that elusive force,
motivation, that errors in the decision process are commonplace.
Fortunately, his corrective action capacity is phenomenal; that is,
he can sense an unwanted deviation and revise his prior decisions
and reactions before something serious develops. Hence, on balance,
man is a very highly developed aid to system reliability and safety.
Of course, it is rare to be able to trace precisely these causeeffect mechanisms. This is particularly true if one is looking for
legal certainty of the evidence. For as one legally oriented, but
former pilot, NTSB Board Member was prone to say, everytime
staff members tried to put something of human factors significance
into one of the Board's blue cover reports: "How do you know what
was going on inside the pilot's head?" He argued that insufficient
hard data were available to "prove" the motivation and rationale
for crew members' actions. He would never even accept opinions of
qualified experts in psycho-social behavior, some of whom were on
the Board's staff and others who were referenced or brought in for
testimony. This Board Member typified the problem of trying to
convince people who, because of their own particular background,
cannot escape from value loaded judgments, even when confronted
with empirical evidence. The result was that highly probable avenues of understanding the error mechanism never found their way
into NTSB reports.
Examples of design effects on the perception/decision/reaction
process, i.e. design-induced error, are so numerous that they are
difficult to discuss without leaving the impression the items mentioned are singular deficiencies. Accordingly, the reader is counseled
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to consult human engineering textbooks;" design safety handbooks;"5 or handbooks similar to the latter which are part of every
major manufacturer's engineering work process. These documents,
as well as accident reports and analyses such as the ADIPE report,
chronicle the bitter lessons of the past. Suffice to say here, a perception oriented design-induced error could be as simple as not
providing sufficient illumination or attention getting characteristics
for a warning light. Design-induced decision errors could, as
mentioned earlier, emanate from inadequate pilot or maintenance
handbooks. Or to take a more hardware-oriented example, consider a control system prone to "pilot induced" oscillations. At a
given stick force and direction, the pilot decides the aircraft is
going where he wants it to go.
Insufficient anticipatory information is transmitted to him, however, to preclude overcontrolling and his memory influence in the
decision process cannot compensate for what else is going on in
the control loop. Design affecting the human reaction mode could
be as simple as the length of the control stick. Some years ago, a
fighter aircraft was actually designed that required the pilot to extend a telescoping control stick so increased leverage (force) could
be applied to the controls to recover from a spin.
AVOIDING DESIGN-INDUCED HUMAN ERROR

This brings us to the principal lesson people should appreciate
when discussing human error, design-induced, or otherwise. There
is a difference between what a man can do and what he will do-what he is capable of doing and what he is expected to do or what
someone wants him to do. Such vagaries in performance are normal
human behavior to some level of probability, and it is 'a rare case
indeed that a given human error is a first time occurrence.
As a matter of fact, man has a remarkable capability to compensate for inherently hazardous situations, at least up to a point."
His awareness of the hazard actually produces a higher level of
safety than might be expected theoretically, all other things being
4

See, e.g., HUMAN ENGINEERING GUIDE TO EQUIPMENT DESIGN (H. Cott
and R. Kinkade eds. Govt. Printing Office, 1972).
1
1 USAF SYSTEMS COMMAND, SYSTEM SAFETY, AFSC DESIGN HANDBOOK,
DH 1-6 (Wash., D.C.).
" See, e.g., Address, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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equal. This, in turn, accounts for the difficulty in differentiating
design-induced error from "pure" human error. A pilot can live
with and compensate for a poorly human-engineered fuel selector
valve, for example, until that one time when other tasks, memories,
or cues interfere with the job of selecting a particular fuel tankbut again, this is a matter of normal human behavior.
The criteria for whether some error is design-induced would
seem to depend upon a determination that a more error free system
could have been designed initially and reasonably according to
known human factors principles. The "system" in this instance must
encompass both the vehicle and the man, with the man being part
of a group of people with certain qualifications for his presumed
control role. Also, careful study of the environment must be made
to make certain that external conditions were not present for which
the machine was not designed, or in which the man was not supposed to become involved.
The techniques for avoiding design-induced human errors are
quite well known even though not universally applied. They include:
* Task Analyses as part of the design process.
* Good human engineering of controls, displays and workspace.
" Hazard Integration Analyses using mockups and simulators
which should be a continuing part of the design process.
" Job Hazard Analyses wherein typical operational people are
used in a real world situation in a last phase effort before
releasing a system for general use.
" Accident/Incident Investigation to assess whether the assumptions made during design were valid.
Optimally, an interdisciplinary team would be used in these efforts,
comprised of engineers, psychologists, medical personnel, operations
specialists, and safety personnel.
CONCLUSION

Throughout this article, most examples and references to human
error were cited from a pilot error point of view. This was a matter
of convenience, not singular intent. As events of the past several
months have highlighted, there are other classes of people involved
in aviation safety "error"; for example, air traffic controllers. These
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human errors, too, can be minimized, if not eliminated, through
design.
Unfortunately, the pilot-error syndrome has had most of the
emphasis in the past. This is "unfortunate" for two reasons. First,
an oversimplified view of the system is taken if the pilot or any
other single person is examined as the presumed savior or perpetrator of aviation accidents. Secondly, by emphasizing pilot error, performance of other key groups, such as air traffic controllers, has
not been investigated or studied to the degree it should have for
optimum safety balance within the system. The same capabilities
and limitations in human behavior apply to air traffic controllers,
maintenance personnel, operational managers, and others, as to
pilots. The need for understanding human error phenomena is
universal if accidents resulting therefrom are to be minimized.
It does not follow that, if an accident is ascribed to pilot error,
controller error, or anybody else's error, the best remedial action
rests with the person or persons in the same category. It may be
the only short-term solution available; but a much more time- and
cost-effective approach is to look for the design approaches that
can be used to minimize if not eliminate the problem over the long
run.

As stated at the beginning of the article, human error is a
fascinating subject, and now we can cite another reason why: we
have such a long way to go to apply the knowledge we already
have towards the prevention of human error accidents.

